WHAT
THE CARTOON JIHADISTS WANT.
Comic
Relief
by
Annia Ciezadlo
Post
date: 02.16.06
Issue
date: 02.27.06
Beirut,
Lebanon
For
the Western news media, always eager to revisit Lebanon's bloody 15-year civil
war, the Muslim rampage through a Christian neighborhood in Beirut on February
5 was a disappointment. A mob of predominantly Sunni Muslims threw stones at a
Maronite Catholic church--a desecration most militias refrained from even
during the civil war--and yet Beirut's Christians turned the other cheek. A
peaceful counterdemonstration that night felt like a Cedar Revolution class
reunion: Young men and women milled around chanting desultory slogans, then
went home. By nightfall, what was assumed to be a ham-handed Syrian attempt to
stir up sectarian trouble in Lebanon had fizzled. "We will not fall in the
trap," proclaimed Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. "Our national unity is
stronger than Syrian destruction."
The
cartoon intifada--as the sometimes violent protests over a Danish newspaper's
publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed have come to be
known--has been portrayed in the Western press as an epic struggle between West
and East, Christendom and Islam. The image of angry, stone-throwing Muslims
assaulting the Christian neighborhood of Ashrafiyeh fit right into that
clash-of-civilizations paradigm.
But,
as the world tuned in to watch a classic Christian-Muslim image from Lebanon's
last war, it missed another picture: mainstream Sunni clerics frantically
trying to hold back a bandana-wearing, brick-throwing Sunni mob that no longer
respects their clerical robes. "I asked those troublemakers, 'What do the
people who live in Ashrafiyeh have to do with the people who published those
blasphemous cartoons about our Prophet?'" lamented one Sunni cleric from
Dar Al Fatwa, Lebanon's highest Sunni spiritual authority. "I asked them,
'Why were those men destroying cars and public property? Why did they throw
rocks at a church, which is a house of God?' Those people were not true
Muslims. They had other agendas."
In
Lebanon and Syria, the cartoon jihad is not a battle between West and East.
It's a struggle by mainstream Sunnis to contain a growing network of radical
Islamists. The Sunnis who burned Beirut's Danish Embassy weren't there to
defend their Prophet from Lurpak butter or an obscure Danish newspaper. They
weren't even there, really, to assault Christians. They came to
Ashrafiyeh--from Lebanon's northern Islamist pockets, its Palestinian camps,
and from neighboring Syria--to teach the mainstream Sunni establishment a
lesson. Most of all, they were there to send a message to Saad Hariri, the
Saudi- and U.S.-backed figurehead of Lebanon's current parliamentary majority
and the ostensible leader of Lebanon's Sunni community. The message was this: You
cannot control us. What's frightening is that they might be right.
Here's
a story from Lebanon that didn't make the international news: On February 2,
someone detonated a small, one-kilogram bomb at a Lebanese army barracks in
Ramlet Al Baida, a wealthy seafront neighborhood in predominantly Muslim West
Beirut. Three hours earlier, someone claiming to represent "Al Qaeda in
Lebanon" called a Lebanese newspaper and threatened to bomb several
security bases unless the government freed 13 members of the group arrested in
early January. The phone call was traced to Ain Al Hilweh, the most squalid and
desperate--and the most militant--of Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps.
Today,
Lebanese security forces are worried that Al Qaeda-linked networks have decided
to set up a military infrastructure in Lebanon, perhaps even forging ties to
Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi. On February 11, Lebanon's acting
interior minister admitted as much to a French newspaper, adding that "the
soil is fertile." According to the Lebanese newspaper As Safir, some of
the Al Qaeda suspects confessed to planning the same types of terrorist attacks
in Lebanon as in Iraq.
In
fact, they already tried once. In September 2004, Lebanese security forces
uncovered a plot to bomb, among other sites, the Italian Embassy--in the heart
of Beirut's rebuilt downtown--as retaliation for Italy's support of the Iraq
war. When a suspect named Ismail Khatib died in custody, residents of his
hometown, Majdal Anjar, erupted with rage, destroying shops on the
Beirut-Damascus road, smashing windows, and blocking the highway with burning
tires. Long before the February 5 demonstrations, the Majdal Anjar riots
revealed a deep current of support for Al Qaeda-style terrorism: "The
Interior Ministry accuses Ismail Khatib of recruiting fighters against the
American invaders in Iraq. Well, this is an honor for him that should earn him
respect, not death in a Lebanese detention center," raged pro-Syrian
activist Maan Bashour at the dead man's funeral. Last week, in a disquieting
sign of interconnected loyalties, the anonymous Ain Al Hilweh caller threatened
that his group would not permit "the tragedy of Ismail Khatib" to be
repeated.
For
the Lebanese government, northern Islamist pockets like Majdal Anjar have been
a perennial embarrassment. In theory, Lebanon's prime minister--and its leading
Sunni families--represent the Sunni minority. But even Rafik Hariri, the
powerful and popular former prime minister slain a year ago, had a hard time
controlling Lebanon's Islamist backwaters. Hariri came from the relatively
peaceful southern city of Sidon, not from the restive Sunni north. His son Saad
is now the putative leader of the anti-Syrian majority in parliament. But
inexperienced Saad is not as strong a figure as his father. "The radical
Sunni fringe has a lot of control outside Beirut," says Eugène
Sensenig-Dabbous, an assistant professor of political science at Lebanon's
Notre Dame University and co-head of the Libanlink Diversity Center, a Beirut-based
interfaith nonprofit.
After
the February 5 clashes, some Lebanese are worried that Syrian dictator Bashar
Assad may be using Lebanon's radical Sunnis against Hariri in a battle for the
Sunni street. But, in doing so, the Syrian regime risks repeating the mistake
the United States made when it funneled billions of dollars to Afghan
mujahedeen: feeding a jihad it cannot keep caged. Take the Ahbash, a cult-like
movement carefully groomed by Syrian intelligence into a Lebanese proxy. German
prosecutor Detlev Mehlis, who conducted the U.N. investigation into Rafik
Hariri's murder, found evidence that the Ahbash played a key role in planning
Hariri's killing. "After the Hariri assassination, the Ahbash adopted a
low profile, but it doesn't mean that their influence is decreasing," says
Lokman Slim, leader of Hayyabina ("Let's Go"), a civil society group
that promotes a secular Lebanon.
For
years, the Syrian regime's rationale for occupying Lebanon was this: Without
Syria to babysit, Lebanon's warring factions would collapse back into civil
war. That's the rationale that led the United States to back the Syrian
dominion over Lebanon for more than a decade. Similarly, the Baath regime has
always used radical Sunnis as bogeymen. Without its dictatorship, goes the
argument, the Muslim Brotherhood would ignite the Levant.
Syria
has cried the Islamist wolf for so long that the West, and perhaps even the
Lebanese government itself, has begun to underestimate the real threat. That
miscalculation became painfully obvious on February 5, when Lebanese security
forces made a miserable showing despite ample warning that trouble was on its
way: first the burning of the Danish Embassy in Damascus, then busloads of
Islamists massing in cities like Tripoli, in northern Lebanon. "It takes
two hours to get from Tripoli to Beirut--they could have stopped them, but
nothing was done," says Farid El Khazen, a member of parliament and a
political science professor at the American University of Beirut. "And
they knew that, the day before, there was a rehearsal, so to speak, when they
burned down the Danish Embassy in Damascus."
Ever
since the Iraq war, and especially in recent months, Assad's government has
shown an increasing willingness to play with Islamist fire. After all, a bulwark
isn't much use without something to hold back. As the Syrian regime grows
increasingly desperate, it is more and more willing to entertain the kind of
Islamists that could pose a threat to its own existence and the entire
region--a threat that the Lebanese government has, until recently, been loath
to acknowledge. "It proves that the Lebanese have learned very well the
message of the Syrian Baath regime," says Slim. "Instead of saying,
'We have a problem inside the country,' we are hiding it." Until now.
Annia
Ciezadlo is a Beirut-based writer.
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